My question is: Does human nature ever actively contradict with evolutionary principles?
This is difficult to answer, and involves making clear one's definition of 'evolutionary principle.' If one means the principles which strictly promote passing on one's genes to the next generation, then human nature absolutely can contradict with them; some humans choose not to reproduce, some humans have sexual orientations which (assuming they act upon only those orientations) do not lead to reproduction, and some humans choose to engage in activities which clearly threaten their lives, therefore jeopardising their chances of passing on their genes. If one means the principles which promote the survival of the species as a whole, I think that human nature can also contradict with them - oddly enough, by the aspects of human nature which promote the survival of the individual, at the expense of the species. Overall, human nature is simply too variable to align itself with one particular goal.
Sunday, May 6, 2012
Q&A 11, First Answer
The basic form of my question is: What is the relation between evolution and emotions?
Emotions, like every other aspect of human nature, are determined by the process of natural selection. However, like many other aspects, they are not always purely practical. Emotions can have other effects than those which caused them to be selected into human nature, and I think it is often these effects which can help in the development of a moral code. For example, the evolutionary use of empathy might be to promote group ties which contribute to the overall well-being of a species. However, empathy can also extend to those not in one's immediate group, and perhaps even those not of one's own species. This could lead to a general 'golden rule' type morality, which later on might develop into a more complex code of ethics, promoting tolerance and kindness to others, support of equality, or even vegetarianism.
Emotions, like every other aspect of human nature, are determined by the process of natural selection. However, like many other aspects, they are not always purely practical. Emotions can have other effects than those which caused them to be selected into human nature, and I think it is often these effects which can help in the development of a moral code. For example, the evolutionary use of empathy might be to promote group ties which contribute to the overall well-being of a species. However, empathy can also extend to those not in one's immediate group, and perhaps even those not of one's own species. This could lead to a general 'golden rule' type morality, which later on might develop into a more complex code of ethics, promoting tolerance and kindness to others, support of equality, or even vegetarianism.
Technology as a Scapegoat
I have heard many people claim that technology is responsible for some significant aspect or aspects of the world's current problems. However, I think that in most cases the problem is not due to the technology itself, but instead to people's use of it. The television, for example, is not an inherently evil object; one can use it to convey important information (as on some science shows) or provide quality entertainment (as in the cases of some films which are undeniably works of art). However, people both misuse and overuse it, by spending an inordinate amount of time fixated on mind-numbing reality shows and other such content-lacking media. Yet many people blame the television itself for this problem. Similarly, many technologies which humans have used to cause death, suffering, or other negative effects have perfectly legitimate other uses which could greatly benefit many people. Again, focusing on the technology is ineffective; if we eliminate the technology which enables us to do some immoral or problematic thing, we will simply find another way to do that very same thing. The problem is with people, not with technology - but owning up to being the cause of serious problems is a difficult action for many people, so rather than doing so they find a convenient scapegoat.
Saturday, May 5, 2012
Response: Replacing vs. Enhancing
In response to Andrew Nelson's post "Human-Directed Evolution" (5/5/2012):
I do not think that continuing to pursue 'artificial evolution' is at all a bad idea; in fact, I think it is a very good one. While science-fiction novels and films frequently depict dystopian futures wherein 'normal' humans have to show that they have some kind of special quality that makes them better than 'enhanced' humans, in reality I think that taking advantage of technological enhancements would have relatively few negative effects. Of course, such advancements could very lead to a class divide, but that is a problem of capitalism rather than of the technology itself. In a socialist or communism society, the advancements would only be positive, and anyone who chose to could take advantage of them.
This last point is why I prefer the idea of technological enhancements to eugenics - because enhancements are available to pre-existing people, rather than to a new generation. This would make them, I think, much more appealing to many people, because they do not make already-living people 'defunct.' This makes the idea much more practical, as it is more likely to garner mass support.
I do not think that continuing to pursue 'artificial evolution' is at all a bad idea; in fact, I think it is a very good one. While science-fiction novels and films frequently depict dystopian futures wherein 'normal' humans have to show that they have some kind of special quality that makes them better than 'enhanced' humans, in reality I think that taking advantage of technological enhancements would have relatively few negative effects. Of course, such advancements could very lead to a class divide, but that is a problem of capitalism rather than of the technology itself. In a socialist or communism society, the advancements would only be positive, and anyone who chose to could take advantage of them.
This last point is why I prefer the idea of technological enhancements to eugenics - because enhancements are available to pre-existing people, rather than to a new generation. This would make them, I think, much more appealing to many people, because they do not make already-living people 'defunct.' This makes the idea much more practical, as it is more likely to garner mass support.
Sunday, April 29, 2012
Ancient Debates - Inherited Guilt
Many old texts, whether religious, fictional, or historical, exhibit a particularly interesting variation on LaMarke's invalid theory of evolution - namely, the idea of inherited guilt. These texts suggest that if one's forbears committed immoral acts, one is guilty of those acts by proxy. The Bible provides numerous examples of this; the concept of original sin (that is, all of humanity is guilty due to Adam and Eve's initial sin of eating the apple from the Tree of Knowledge) illustrates it well, as does the statement that illegitimate children (and their descendants for nine subsequent generations) cannot enter heaven. Contemporary examples of this type of thinking also, unfortunately, exist; the idea that descendants of Nazis (regardless of their own opinions of their ancestors' actions) owe the descendants of those who suffered due to the holocaust occurs with alarming frequency. Subtler examples are even more widespread and perhaps more insidious; people may assume that, because one's parents were alcoholic, one will inevitably become an alcoholic oneself. These cases do have some basis in fact - growing up around alcoholics may predispose one towards alcoholism oneself - but they are far from certain. Many circumstances, both internal and external, can cause one to reject the lifestyles of one's guardians or mentor figures.
Response: Intelligence vs. Knowledge
In response to Katie Emerson's post "Are We Getting Dumber?" (April 28, 2012):
Before answering this question, I think one must distinguish between the related, but separate, concepts of knowledge and intelligence. Knowledge refers simply to the amount of information one possesses about the world. Intelligence refers to one's ability to understand, process, and learn new information, and come up with original ideas. I do think that, in some cases, technology can result in decreased knowledge. However, I do not think that it results in decreased intelligence. Furthermore, much of the seeming decrease in knowledge which many modern Americans exhibit is likely due less to technology than to sub-par educational systems. Regardless of the existence of spell-check, if schools require students to write a decent number of papers by hand or on programs without spell-check, the students will learn how to spell. Similarly, reading a lot as a child significantly enhances one's spelling and grammatical skills later in life. Incorporating higher-level reading instruction into lower-grade curricula would help young students develop both better spelling skills and a better grasp of correct grammar.
Before answering this question, I think one must distinguish between the related, but separate, concepts of knowledge and intelligence. Knowledge refers simply to the amount of information one possesses about the world. Intelligence refers to one's ability to understand, process, and learn new information, and come up with original ideas. I do think that, in some cases, technology can result in decreased knowledge. However, I do not think that it results in decreased intelligence. Furthermore, much of the seeming decrease in knowledge which many modern Americans exhibit is likely due less to technology than to sub-par educational systems. Regardless of the existence of spell-check, if schools require students to write a decent number of papers by hand or on programs without spell-check, the students will learn how to spell. Similarly, reading a lot as a child significantly enhances one's spelling and grammatical skills later in life. Incorporating higher-level reading instruction into lower-grade curricula would help young students develop both better spelling skills and a better grasp of correct grammar.
Q&A 10, Second Answer
My question is: What implications would radical freedom have for current ethical thought?
I think that accepting radical freedom would effectively demolish ethics. Ethical theory often relies heavily on the idea that there is, or must be, an objective standard of morality, and radical freedom claims that such a thing is totally nonexistent. This would cause ethics to deteriorate into an ultimately pointless study of individual codes of morality.
Of course, if the theory of radical freedom is actually true, then humanity should probably accept it as such. Personally I do not think that it is true. Unfortunately, there appears to be no way to prove that an objective morality exists. Proof, however, may not be necessary; probability does seem to indicate the existence of an objective morality, and due to the problems which accepting radical freedom would cause, it is probably best for humanity to act upon the assumption that morality is in fact objective.
I think that accepting radical freedom would effectively demolish ethics. Ethical theory often relies heavily on the idea that there is, or must be, an objective standard of morality, and radical freedom claims that such a thing is totally nonexistent. This would cause ethics to deteriorate into an ultimately pointless study of individual codes of morality.
Of course, if the theory of radical freedom is actually true, then humanity should probably accept it as such. Personally I do not think that it is true. Unfortunately, there appears to be no way to prove that an objective morality exists. Proof, however, may not be necessary; probability does seem to indicate the existence of an objective morality, and due to the problems which accepting radical freedom would cause, it is probably best for humanity to act upon the assumption that morality is in fact objective.
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
Q&A 10, First Answer
The basic form of my question is: Are humans born with radical freedom, or do they develop this ability with age?
Early Sartre would probably suggest the former. Later Sartre, however, might agree more with the latter. I think he would likely say that humans should work towards achieving radical freedom, and that this effort will likely be a lifelong project. Initially, humans are entirely dependent upon others to make their choices for them; later on, they become gradually more autonomous, until they are relatively free of others' influences.
My own viewpoint on this issue is virtually inapplicable, as I do not think that humans ever have radical freedom, both because I think that the universe is in fact predetermined and because I do not think that (even given the existence of free will) humans could ever be sufficiently free of outside influence as to be radically free.
Early Sartre would probably suggest the former. Later Sartre, however, might agree more with the latter. I think he would likely say that humans should work towards achieving radical freedom, and that this effort will likely be a lifelong project. Initially, humans are entirely dependent upon others to make their choices for them; later on, they become gradually more autonomous, until they are relatively free of others' influences.
My own viewpoint on this issue is virtually inapplicable, as I do not think that humans ever have radical freedom, both because I think that the universe is in fact predetermined and because I do not think that (even given the existence of free will) humans could ever be sufficiently free of outside influence as to be radically free.
Sunday, April 22, 2012
A Quite Problematic Idea
The idea that we choose our emotions, in addition to being almost obviously inaccurate, is problematic in that can easily lead to a 'blame the victim' mentality. Frankly, the idea of radical freedom in general can lead to this mentality, although it seems most apparent to me in relation to emotions. If one believes that individuals can choose their emotions, then two morally debatable conclusions result: firstly, that one is free to emotionally attack someone as much as one wants, because one's target can simply choose to completely ignore one's actions, and secondly, that people who are emotionally distressed (for example, people who are depressed due to poverty, abuse, or other external circumstances) are simply choosing to feel that way, and as such one is not obligated (or even encouraged) to assist them. Some people do actually seem to believe something along these lines; such people typically tell others who are depressed to 'cheer up' or 'get over it,' tell justifiably angry people to 'just let it go,' and assume that those who do not share their appreciation for certain things (for example, works of art) are simply being stubborn. In most cases, this sort of behaviour actually makes others feel worse rather than better, and dislike things (i.e. works of art) even more than they already do, out of resentment of the other person's annoying attitude.
Saturday, April 21, 2012
Response: Basic Needs
In response to Justine Cozza's post on 4/20/12:
It is certainly true that some aspects of human behaviour are not products of choice, but are instead due to biological needs. However, I think that these aspects are far fewer in number than many may believe. For example, even the seemingly innate tendency to take care of one's own children does not exert such a strong influence that one cannot choose to ignore it. People do neglect, abandon, or otherwise mistreat children every day. Many other seemingly biological urges are similarly malleable or variable. The urge to engage in physical conflict with those one dislikes may be somewhat innate for most people, but the majority of people learn fairly early on to ignore or otherwise divert that urge. The urge to engage in sexual activities is also innate, and quite strong, for most people, and in many cases ignoring it can cause psychological problems and sometimes physical problems. However, some people lack this urge, or find it relatively insignificant, so that choosing not to act upon it does them no harm. Similarly, as far as I know, all human beings require sleep, but the amount of sleep they require varies widely. As a straightforward example, the ideal amount of sleep I must get in order to function at full capacity is between seven and eight hours, whereas one of my friends requires only between four and five hours. This makes 'human needs' very difficult to identify. In the end, we may end up only with a very vague and extremely basic list including such things as air, food, water, sleep, and company (all variable in quantity, and the last only virtually universal).
It is certainly true that some aspects of human behaviour are not products of choice, but are instead due to biological needs. However, I think that these aspects are far fewer in number than many may believe. For example, even the seemingly innate tendency to take care of one's own children does not exert such a strong influence that one cannot choose to ignore it. People do neglect, abandon, or otherwise mistreat children every day. Many other seemingly biological urges are similarly malleable or variable. The urge to engage in physical conflict with those one dislikes may be somewhat innate for most people, but the majority of people learn fairly early on to ignore or otherwise divert that urge. The urge to engage in sexual activities is also innate, and quite strong, for most people, and in many cases ignoring it can cause psychological problems and sometimes physical problems. However, some people lack this urge, or find it relatively insignificant, so that choosing not to act upon it does them no harm. Similarly, as far as I know, all human beings require sleep, but the amount of sleep they require varies widely. As a straightforward example, the ideal amount of sleep I must get in order to function at full capacity is between seven and eight hours, whereas one of my friends requires only between four and five hours. This makes 'human needs' very difficult to identify. In the end, we may end up only with a very vague and extremely basic list including such things as air, food, water, sleep, and company (all variable in quantity, and the last only virtually universal).
Response: Abnormal Humanity
In response to Andrew Nelson's post "Q&A: What are the Limits of Human Freedom?" (April 20, 2012):
We've discussed the social nature of humanity before in class, and the idea that solitude can be a kind of hell does follow quite nicely from that. However, it also caused me to think about another point, that of humans with abnormal natures - for example, psychopaths (not sociopath, who have normal natures but act abnormally due to outside influences). Are such humans inherently social as well? Certainly they initially require the presence of other humans in order to survive, but once reaching maturity they often seem to have no emotional need for the presence of other humans. I am not a psychologist myself, but I am interested in this issue, so I'd appreciate any opinions.
We've discussed the social nature of humanity before in class, and the idea that solitude can be a kind of hell does follow quite nicely from that. However, it also caused me to think about another point, that of humans with abnormal natures - for example, psychopaths (not sociopath, who have normal natures but act abnormally due to outside influences). Are such humans inherently social as well? Certainly they initially require the presence of other humans in order to survive, but once reaching maturity they often seem to have no emotional need for the presence of other humans. I am not a psychologist myself, but I am interested in this issue, so I'd appreciate any opinions.
Sunday, April 15, 2012
Downsides of Collectivism
Both Marx and Plato supported the idea of collective child-raising. While I agree that this approach does solve many of the problems of family-based child-raising (possible brainwashing/indoctrination with harmful beliefs, many forms of abuse, and a sense of obligation to continue unhealthy relationships), it also deprives children of emotional connections which are important for unproblematic development. Of course, these connections are not absolutely essential; some people who, even in contemporary society, did not have the chance to develop such connections (for example, those who as children moved from one foster family to another) have become relatively well-adjusted, overall healthy individuals. However, the statistics are not at all in their favour, and even the best off usually had to overcome at least some psychological trauma prior to obtaining a satisfactory mindset and lifestyle. As such, it would certainly be best to try and allow emotional connections to develop.
I am not certain yet, but at the moment I think that the ideal situation for raising children would be a modified family system, with improved education (to prevent brainwashing), heightened regulatory measures (to prevent abuse), and changed social norms (to prevent people from feeling they must remain in unhealthy relationships purely for familial reasons).
I am not certain yet, but at the moment I think that the ideal situation for raising children would be a modified family system, with improved education (to prevent brainwashing), heightened regulatory measures (to prevent abuse), and changed social norms (to prevent people from feeling they must remain in unhealthy relationships purely for familial reasons).
Q&A 9, Second Answer
My question is: Is it possible to hypothesise
an economic structure wherein nobody is required to work?
Yes, but such a structure would only be ideal in the relatively distant future. As the world is now, many methods of producing goods are automated; more could be so if people did not protest against mechanical production due to fear of losing their jobs. If we could make such methods self-sustaining (and we have the ability to do this now; we simply do not because it would upset the current economic structure) we could offer the goods produced by them free of charge, and devote our labour and money to other areas. This change in economic focus would help accelerate progress, and more systems could become automated. Working would become less necessary, not only to survive, but to enjoy a luxurious lifestyle. As a result, less people would choose to work, but that would be okay, because there would be less jobs necessary. Eventually, all or virtually all careers would no longer exist, because they would all be performed by machinery. At this point, society could actually become communist, and everyone could enjoy equal fruits of the labour of machines. However, such a society is currently very far away from implementation, so in modern times, socialism (wherein nobody is required to work in order to survive, but where most people would probably choose to work so that they could enjoy better lifestyles) is a more practical option than communism.
Yes, but such a structure would only be ideal in the relatively distant future. As the world is now, many methods of producing goods are automated; more could be so if people did not protest against mechanical production due to fear of losing their jobs. If we could make such methods self-sustaining (and we have the ability to do this now; we simply do not because it would upset the current economic structure) we could offer the goods produced by them free of charge, and devote our labour and money to other areas. This change in economic focus would help accelerate progress, and more systems could become automated. Working would become less necessary, not only to survive, but to enjoy a luxurious lifestyle. As a result, less people would choose to work, but that would be okay, because there would be less jobs necessary. Eventually, all or virtually all careers would no longer exist, because they would all be performed by machinery. At this point, society could actually become communist, and everyone could enjoy equal fruits of the labour of machines. However, such a society is currently very far away from implementation, so in modern times, socialism (wherein nobody is required to work in order to survive, but where most people would probably choose to work so that they could enjoy better lifestyles) is a more practical option than communism.
Q&A 9, First Answer
The basic form of my question is: In a communist society, what would happen to those who chose not to work?
Marx seems to have supposed that humans are innately predisposed to, under the right conditions, enjoy working. I do not agree with this; while I do think that, with ideal conditions, many humans would choose to engage in some sort of lucrative work, there would still be some whose 'perfect life' would consist of engaging in relatively unproductive pursuits, such as playing chess all the time. There is nothing wrong with this, but it does make the idea of a society wherein everyone works productively infeasible.
As such, I think that in order to make such a society work, there would have to be some sort of consequence for not working. However, that is barely any better than capitalism, as it still forces everyone to work, and in careers they might not have chosen for themselves (playing chess can be a career, but in such a society it would likely not be available). The only difference would be that wealth would be more evenly distributed, but that is not significant enough of an improvement to justify implementing the system. I imagine that if Marx had held different views of human nature, he might have come up with a slightly different idea, or have stopped at the idea of socialism (wherein people can choose not to work, and as a consequence simply live a very Spartan lifestyle).
Marx seems to have supposed that humans are innately predisposed to, under the right conditions, enjoy working. I do not agree with this; while I do think that, with ideal conditions, many humans would choose to engage in some sort of lucrative work, there would still be some whose 'perfect life' would consist of engaging in relatively unproductive pursuits, such as playing chess all the time. There is nothing wrong with this, but it does make the idea of a society wherein everyone works productively infeasible.
As such, I think that in order to make such a society work, there would have to be some sort of consequence for not working. However, that is barely any better than capitalism, as it still forces everyone to work, and in careers they might not have chosen for themselves (playing chess can be a career, but in such a society it would likely not be available). The only difference would be that wealth would be more evenly distributed, but that is not significant enough of an improvement to justify implementing the system. I imagine that if Marx had held different views of human nature, he might have come up with a slightly different idea, or have stopped at the idea of socialism (wherein people can choose not to work, and as a consequence simply live a very Spartan lifestyle).
Wednesday, April 11, 2012
Response: Capitalism and Socialism
In response to Justine Cozza's post on 4/11/12:
I think that the last sentence of this post - "We used work to survive, but now we work to get nice things and to keep up with always changing trends" - is worth taking another look at. The unfortunate fact is that in capitalist society, we still do work to live. Those who, whether through choice or necessity, do not or cannot work have little to no safety net; they typically either exist at the edge of society, often attempting to ignore their miserable situation with the help of alcohol or other substances, or simply die of starvation, exposure, or as victims of violence from others in similar desperate circumstances. The conception of working to get nice things is very much an upper-and-middle-class idea, and is also ultimately untrue in a capitalist society.
If this idea were actually true, then the society would not be capitalist, but would instead be closer to a form of socialism. Actual socialism usually appears to provide slightly more than the bare minimum for continued existence, but this varies depending upon the country in which it exists. In a truly socialist society, work would actually be an option. If someone chose not to work, they would have a very Spartan lifestyle, but they would not die or end up living an absolutely miserable life. If they wished to enhance their quality of life (for example, by purchasing a musical instrument), they could then enter the workforce in order to gain money to fulfil that purpose.
I think that the last sentence of this post - "We used work to survive, but now we work to get nice things and to keep up with always changing trends" - is worth taking another look at. The unfortunate fact is that in capitalist society, we still do work to live. Those who, whether through choice or necessity, do not or cannot work have little to no safety net; they typically either exist at the edge of society, often attempting to ignore their miserable situation with the help of alcohol or other substances, or simply die of starvation, exposure, or as victims of violence from others in similar desperate circumstances. The conception of working to get nice things is very much an upper-and-middle-class idea, and is also ultimately untrue in a capitalist society.
If this idea were actually true, then the society would not be capitalist, but would instead be closer to a form of socialism. Actual socialism usually appears to provide slightly more than the bare minimum for continued existence, but this varies depending upon the country in which it exists. In a truly socialist society, work would actually be an option. If someone chose not to work, they would have a very Spartan lifestyle, but they would not die or end up living an absolutely miserable life. If they wished to enhance their quality of life (for example, by purchasing a musical instrument), they could then enter the workforce in order to gain money to fulfil that purpose.
Sunday, April 8, 2012
Nothing Actually Goes Wrong
One of the ideas we discussed in class was the idea that evil can exist despite an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God because it stems from humans giving in to temptation. Thus, even though God does indeed have a flawless plan, humans mess with the plan by way of their weak willpower. As valid as this idea may seem, however, upon closer inspection one can detect a very large hole in it - namely, that if something as simple as a human's inability to resist the urge to commit a sin can mess with God's plan, then God cannot possibly be omnipotent. If he was, he could (and would, if he was also omnibenevolent) come up with a better, foolproof, humanproof plan.
Thus, we cannot attribute such terrible happenings as unjust wars, serial murders, animal abuse, or terrorist bombings to humanity's giving in to temptation. Instead, we must accept that nothing actually goes wrong with God's plan. Either one can take this as evidence of God's non-existence, God's lack of either omnipotence or omnibenevolence, or human fallibility. Perhaps the apparent contradiction of the existence of evil and the existence of God is not actually a contradiction at all - we simply do not possess the capacity to understand how this can be so. Which explanation we accept depends entirely upon the individual.
Thus, we cannot attribute such terrible happenings as unjust wars, serial murders, animal abuse, or terrorist bombings to humanity's giving in to temptation. Instead, we must accept that nothing actually goes wrong with God's plan. Either one can take this as evidence of God's non-existence, God's lack of either omnipotence or omnibenevolence, or human fallibility. Perhaps the apparent contradiction of the existence of evil and the existence of God is not actually a contradiction at all - we simply do not possess the capacity to understand how this can be so. Which explanation we accept depends entirely upon the individual.
Saturday, April 7, 2012
Response: Metaphor and Inexplicability
In response to Rachel Niddrie's post "How is 'He' Any Different?" (April 5, 2012):
The Roman Catholic conception of God is not the only one, or even the only common one, in Christianity. Different sects have very different ideas of what exactly God is. Furthermore, it is likely, given the literary traditions in the time of its writing, that the Bible was never meant to be interpreted literally. Many of the stories within it are metaphors, the goal of which is to communicate a certain message about how to live. Of course, many Christians (particularly, as the above post suggests, Roman Catholics) interpret the Bible literally anyway, in spite of the frequent and obvious contradictions found within it.
Additionally, even when some (apparently literal) description of God seems to contain an impossibility or a paradox, one can justify it with the argument that, as God is infinitely greater than we are, these seeming impossibilities are in fact not so. Of course, this may seem like a rather weak excuse, and it certainly does not allow one to prove God's existence. It does prevent others from disproving it, however.
This may not be enough to convince many people of God's existence, and that is fine. An atheistic viewpoint is certainly not irrational, as long as the atheist does not claim to be able to prove God's non-existence. Neither are theistic viewpoints irrational, as long as the theist does not claim to be able to prove God's existence. In short, if one feels that it is necessary to have empirical evidence before one will believe in God's existence, then one is an atheist. If one is willing to go on faith, then one is a theist. If one does not wish to believe either way, then one is an agnostic.
The Roman Catholic conception of God is not the only one, or even the only common one, in Christianity. Different sects have very different ideas of what exactly God is. Furthermore, it is likely, given the literary traditions in the time of its writing, that the Bible was never meant to be interpreted literally. Many of the stories within it are metaphors, the goal of which is to communicate a certain message about how to live. Of course, many Christians (particularly, as the above post suggests, Roman Catholics) interpret the Bible literally anyway, in spite of the frequent and obvious contradictions found within it.
Additionally, even when some (apparently literal) description of God seems to contain an impossibility or a paradox, one can justify it with the argument that, as God is infinitely greater than we are, these seeming impossibilities are in fact not so. Of course, this may seem like a rather weak excuse, and it certainly does not allow one to prove God's existence. It does prevent others from disproving it, however.
This may not be enough to convince many people of God's existence, and that is fine. An atheistic viewpoint is certainly not irrational, as long as the atheist does not claim to be able to prove God's non-existence. Neither are theistic viewpoints irrational, as long as the theist does not claim to be able to prove God's existence. In short, if one feels that it is necessary to have empirical evidence before one will believe in God's existence, then one is an atheist. If one is willing to go on faith, then one is a theist. If one does not wish to believe either way, then one is an agnostic.
Q&A 8, Second Answer
The basic form of my question is: Is the Bible a literal account of past events, or is it a manual for ethical behaviour presented in metaphorical form?
I think, quite decisively, that it is the latter. Stories within the Bible contradict one another; if the Bible's writers meant it to act as a literal account, they created it rather badly. However, if the reader takes each individual story as a piece of metaphorically stated advice, the narrative as a whole works out much better.
Of course, some of this advice is now radically outdated. The advice regarding disobedient children found in Deuteronomy 21:18-21 ("If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son...Then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him...And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die") obviously would not be remotely suitable for the modern age. As such, contemporary Christians would need to reinterpret certain verses, in order to adapt the Bible to fit a contemporary setting.
I think, quite decisively, that it is the latter. Stories within the Bible contradict one another; if the Bible's writers meant it to act as a literal account, they created it rather badly. However, if the reader takes each individual story as a piece of metaphorically stated advice, the narrative as a whole works out much better.
Of course, some of this advice is now radically outdated. The advice regarding disobedient children found in Deuteronomy 21:18-21 ("If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son...Then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him...And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die") obviously would not be remotely suitable for the modern age. As such, contemporary Christians would need to reinterpret certain verses, in order to adapt the Bible to fit a contemporary setting.
Q&A 8, First Answer
The basic form of my question is: When faith and reason contradict one another, which course should a Christian take?
I think that it depends on the individual Christian. One could consider oneself a Christian even if the only times one relied on faith were the times when either faith and reason led to the same conclusion, or when they did not do so but did not directly contradict one another either. One could also consider oneself a Christian if one placed rather higher priority on faith; thus, in cases wherein faith and reason contradicted one another, one would follow the course supported by faith. I do not think that this latter system would pose a moral problem as long as one only applied it to oneself. Thus, one cannot use one's faith-driven logic to cause harm to others; neither can one prevent someone else from acting on their faith (as long as it does not harm you or a third party), even if it contradicts one's own faith.
I think that it depends on the individual Christian. One could consider oneself a Christian even if the only times one relied on faith were the times when either faith and reason led to the same conclusion, or when they did not do so but did not directly contradict one another either. One could also consider oneself a Christian if one placed rather higher priority on faith; thus, in cases wherein faith and reason contradicted one another, one would follow the course supported by faith. I do not think that this latter system would pose a moral problem as long as one only applied it to oneself. Thus, one cannot use one's faith-driven logic to cause harm to others; neither can one prevent someone else from acting on their faith (as long as it does not harm you or a third party), even if it contradicts one's own faith.
Sunday, April 1, 2012
Patriotism and Celebration
In general, I think that patriotism is at best unnecessary and at worst entirely immoral. How, then, did such a bad idea become so popular? There are many reasons, but in American culture one of the most appealing may be the frequent institutionalised celebration of patriotism. The Fourth of July, for example, is an occasion which appeals to many people. It provides an opportunity to unite and celebrate a shared cause. It is also fun for children, due to all the excitement and proliferation of high spirits. Merry parades, music, and pleasant food are all strong motivations for most people. While this sort of tradition obviously did not spark the idea of patriotism, I think it likely provides a lot of fuel for the idea to continue, and to be as popular as it is.
Response: Evolutionary Emotions
In response to Kurtiss Keefner's post "Love of Country or Love of the People?" (April 1, 2012):
I agree that many people do not recognise, at least in any depth, that those in other countries are real people, with emotions very similar or identical to their own. The reason for this may be evolutionary. Being attached emotionally to those close to one (historically, these people are often genetically related to one) and then basing one's actions off that attachment, without incorporating abstract ethics, was indeed usually the best way to ensure both one's own safety and the continuation of one's own genetic line. As such, caring only for those one knows personally, or those whom society tells one to care about, may be a default stance, so to speak, of many people. Recognising the personhood of those in other countries usually requires a commitment to at least a small amount of rational thought and consideration - something which many people fail to make time for in their everyday lives. Even after intellectually recognising that those in other countries are also people, it may take a continued commitment to rational consideration to ensure that one takes this recognition into account when making decisions or statements. The only time, it seems, when many people emotionally believe in the personhood of those in other countries is immediately after watching emotionally-charged television footage of happenings in other countries.
I agree that many people do not recognise, at least in any depth, that those in other countries are real people, with emotions very similar or identical to their own. The reason for this may be evolutionary. Being attached emotionally to those close to one (historically, these people are often genetically related to one) and then basing one's actions off that attachment, without incorporating abstract ethics, was indeed usually the best way to ensure both one's own safety and the continuation of one's own genetic line. As such, caring only for those one knows personally, or those whom society tells one to care about, may be a default stance, so to speak, of many people. Recognising the personhood of those in other countries usually requires a commitment to at least a small amount of rational thought and consideration - something which many people fail to make time for in their everyday lives. Even after intellectually recognising that those in other countries are also people, it may take a continued commitment to rational consideration to ensure that one takes this recognition into account when making decisions or statements. The only time, it seems, when many people emotionally believe in the personhood of those in other countries is immediately after watching emotionally-charged television footage of happenings in other countries.
Friday, March 30, 2012
Value of Nations
Nationalism all too often leads to major problems, such as war, prejudice, and economic exploitation. What, then, is the purpose of nations? Should the world eliminate borders and coalesce into one vast country?
This might well be the best path to follow eventually, but currently I think that nations still have uses. Primarily, dividing the world into nations allows it to progress. A relatively small, isolated society can often move forward socially and technologically with far greater ease than can a large, melting-pot-type society (like America), simply due to the fact that smaller societies typically have smaller numbers of differing opinions. Rather than the entire world having to remain stagnant due to a few dissenters, it is best for at least parts of the world to move forward. If they do so, they can then help the rest of the world move forward by following their (societal) example, and by taking advantage of the technological advancements they have made.
This might well be the best path to follow eventually, but currently I think that nations still have uses. Primarily, dividing the world into nations allows it to progress. A relatively small, isolated society can often move forward socially and technologically with far greater ease than can a large, melting-pot-type society (like America), simply due to the fact that smaller societies typically have smaller numbers of differing opinions. Rather than the entire world having to remain stagnant due to a few dissenters, it is best for at least parts of the world to move forward. If they do so, they can then help the rest of the world move forward by following their (societal) example, and by taking advantage of the technological advancements they have made.
Response: Supporting People
In response to Justine Cozza's post on 3/29/2012:
The problem is that the troops are not actually dying to keep American civilians safe, or dying in the name of freedom. They are dying because the American military leaders sent them to do so in order to further an agenda that has far less to do with freedom than it does with fossil fuels. This is not to say that individual soldiers are aware of this; in fact, I suspect that most soldiers are either in the military because it was the best career path available to them, or because they honestly believe that by joining the military they can defend America. In the latter case, their intentions (although not the actuality of what they are doing) is highly admirable; in the former, their intentions may not be admirable, but nor are they reprehensible.
As such, I do not believe that anyone should send cards or food or love to the soldiers overseas as a thank-you for what they are doing - but I do think that they should send those things because they care about the troops as people, separate from their unfortunate choice of career. A card can really help someone in a bad situation feel better, and helping the troops to feel better is a nice (if not necessarily patriotic) thing to do. In general, I think that soldiers are neither exceptionally good people nor exceptionally bad people. Thus, they deserve the same consideration that any person in a dangerous situation would. The best way to support the people working as troops, of course, is to attempt to get the government to bring them home.
The problem is that the troops are not actually dying to keep American civilians safe, or dying in the name of freedom. They are dying because the American military leaders sent them to do so in order to further an agenda that has far less to do with freedom than it does with fossil fuels. This is not to say that individual soldiers are aware of this; in fact, I suspect that most soldiers are either in the military because it was the best career path available to them, or because they honestly believe that by joining the military they can defend America. In the latter case, their intentions (although not the actuality of what they are doing) is highly admirable; in the former, their intentions may not be admirable, but nor are they reprehensible.
As such, I do not believe that anyone should send cards or food or love to the soldiers overseas as a thank-you for what they are doing - but I do think that they should send those things because they care about the troops as people, separate from their unfortunate choice of career. A card can really help someone in a bad situation feel better, and helping the troops to feel better is a nice (if not necessarily patriotic) thing to do. In general, I think that soldiers are neither exceptionally good people nor exceptionally bad people. Thus, they deserve the same consideration that any person in a dangerous situation would. The best way to support the people working as troops, of course, is to attempt to get the government to bring them home.
Sunday, March 25, 2012
Repressed Desires
The Freudian idea that dreams represent repressed infantile wishes seems as if, with some revision, it could apply to many (although not all) dreams. The most important revision, I think, is to remove the 'infantile,' either replacing it with 'childhood' or nothing at all.
With this revision in place, I find myself wondering about the nature of these repressed desires. What could be so terrible that it requires the many layers of chaos and confusion often found in dreams, while being commonplace enough that everyone feels it? There are a few obvious candidates which, although they are not common to everyone (or in some cases, even the majority of people), are common enough that in combination they could conceivably account for the dreams of virtually everyone. The most obvious seem likely to be sadistic, masochistic, or otherwise violent feelings (not universal, but present in a fair number of people), unusual - or in some cases, even commonplace - sexual desires (common to everyone but a few people with disorders, and a few more who are asexual), and possibly desires to do something the dreamer considers to be morally wrong (most people have at least a few things they feel this way about, whether they be stealing, doing drugs, or overeating).
With this revision in place, I find myself wondering about the nature of these repressed desires. What could be so terrible that it requires the many layers of chaos and confusion often found in dreams, while being commonplace enough that everyone feels it? There are a few obvious candidates which, although they are not common to everyone (or in some cases, even the majority of people), are common enough that in combination they could conceivably account for the dreams of virtually everyone. The most obvious seem likely to be sadistic, masochistic, or otherwise violent feelings (not universal, but present in a fair number of people), unusual - or in some cases, even commonplace - sexual desires (common to everyone but a few people with disorders, and a few more who are asexual), and possibly desires to do something the dreamer considers to be morally wrong (most people have at least a few things they feel this way about, whether they be stealing, doing drugs, or overeating).
Response: Future Fears
In response to Lyndsey Johnson's post "A Dream is a Wish Your Heart Makes" (March 25, 2012):
In addition to nightmares being disguised versions of traumatic events in one's past, I think it is likely that they can be manifestations of fears. For example, if one is afraid of the dark (even if one has had no traumatic experiences involving darkness) one might have a nightmare about being in the dark, with no access to light. These fears might also be disguised, either in order to prevent the nightmare from becoming so bad that one wakes up (thus preserving sleep), or as a result of the (probably) partially hallucinoid nature of dreams. This would explain nightmares containing such seemingly ridiculous elements as being, let us say, chased by a giant stapler. The dreamer most likely does not have an actual fear of staplers; it is more likely that they are simply afraid of being chased by something dangerous - as a giant, sentient, angry stapler would probably be.
In addition to nightmares being disguised versions of traumatic events in one's past, I think it is likely that they can be manifestations of fears. For example, if one is afraid of the dark (even if one has had no traumatic experiences involving darkness) one might have a nightmare about being in the dark, with no access to light. These fears might also be disguised, either in order to prevent the nightmare from becoming so bad that one wakes up (thus preserving sleep), or as a result of the (probably) partially hallucinoid nature of dreams. This would explain nightmares containing such seemingly ridiculous elements as being, let us say, chased by a giant stapler. The dreamer most likely does not have an actual fear of staplers; it is more likely that they are simply afraid of being chased by something dangerous - as a giant, sentient, angry stapler would probably be.
Response: Lack of Information
In response to Katie Emerson's post "Dreams and Determinism" (March 25, 2012):
I think the idea that dreams use our subconscious minds to guess at future events is very interesting, and there may indeed be a grain of truth in it. However, I do not think that dreams can predict everything, because human beings do not have access to all possible knowledge. The Universe is incredibly huge, if not infinite in size, so all the variables contained within (which determine future events) are too many in number for the human mind to comprehend. Even if our mental capacities are much greater than they may seem to our conscious minds (and there is evidence that this is true), it is virtually impossible that they are great enough to comprehend the nature of the entire universe.
That said, we can predict some events with relative certainty, even by using only our conscious minds. For example, if I drop my pen from three feet up over my bed, I can predict with virtual certainty that it will fall through the air and land upon the bed. The primary variables involved are relatively few in number, and thus predicting the event is simple. Thus, it is possible that our subconscious minds can take even more variables into account than our conscious minds, and as a result can predict more complex events. However, as it is currently impossible to know which dreams may be indicative of future happenings and which are random brain firings, repressed memories or desires, or simple reruns of things that have happened to us recently, it is not practical to base future activities off what we witness in dreams.
I think the idea that dreams use our subconscious minds to guess at future events is very interesting, and there may indeed be a grain of truth in it. However, I do not think that dreams can predict everything, because human beings do not have access to all possible knowledge. The Universe is incredibly huge, if not infinite in size, so all the variables contained within (which determine future events) are too many in number for the human mind to comprehend. Even if our mental capacities are much greater than they may seem to our conscious minds (and there is evidence that this is true), it is virtually impossible that they are great enough to comprehend the nature of the entire universe.
That said, we can predict some events with relative certainty, even by using only our conscious minds. For example, if I drop my pen from three feet up over my bed, I can predict with virtual certainty that it will fall through the air and land upon the bed. The primary variables involved are relatively few in number, and thus predicting the event is simple. Thus, it is possible that our subconscious minds can take even more variables into account than our conscious minds, and as a result can predict more complex events. However, as it is currently impossible to know which dreams may be indicative of future happenings and which are random brain firings, repressed memories or desires, or simple reruns of things that have happened to us recently, it is not practical to base future activities off what we witness in dreams.
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
Subjective Intuition
Arguments from intuition, in addition to being unscientific, are illogical. As the basis for making objective judgements about the world, they are utterly unsuitable, because they themselves are subjective and not shared by everyone. Furthermore, they can very easily be wrong. While intuitions do sometimes stem from true and innate knowledge about a subject, familial or other social pressures can generate them with just as much ease.
One cannot communicate a 'feeling' that something is right or wrong to others to the extent that the others can 'feel' it in the same way. Thus, basing an argument against, say, homosexuality on an intuition that homosexual acts are disgusting is both illogical and useless, as the only ones whom the argument will convince are those who share that intuition, and who thus already agree with one! I have read just such an argument, and it did not hold up at all under even a small amount of rational questioning.
Of course, many people may argue that their intuitions are universally shared, and that anyone who claims otherwise is deceiving themself, but this does not really work either. It would be very easy for the anti-homosexuality arguer mentioned above to claim that anyone who apparently does not find homosexual acts disgusting is either lying in order to support a misguided agenda, or is homosexual themself. This is obviously ridiculous, and it can apply to other concepts as well.
Lastly, some people may say that their intuitions are at least more likely to be right than wrong, and that even if they are wrong they will do no harm, whereas if they are right but do not act on their intuitions, harm will occur. Unfortunately, this depends on a subjective definition of harm, which all too often rests upon the very intuitions in question. Re-using the homosexuality example, a supporter might claim that allowing homosexuality (against their intuitions) would cause great moral harm, but preventing people from acting on homosexual wishes does those people no harm, because they can always be heterosexual. Naturally, this is fallacious, because homosexuals are not heterosexual - but because of their intuitive 'knowledge' of the matter, people may not recognise this.
One cannot communicate a 'feeling' that something is right or wrong to others to the extent that the others can 'feel' it in the same way. Thus, basing an argument against, say, homosexuality on an intuition that homosexual acts are disgusting is both illogical and useless, as the only ones whom the argument will convince are those who share that intuition, and who thus already agree with one! I have read just such an argument, and it did not hold up at all under even a small amount of rational questioning.
Of course, many people may argue that their intuitions are universally shared, and that anyone who claims otherwise is deceiving themself, but this does not really work either. It would be very easy for the anti-homosexuality arguer mentioned above to claim that anyone who apparently does not find homosexual acts disgusting is either lying in order to support a misguided agenda, or is homosexual themself. This is obviously ridiculous, and it can apply to other concepts as well.
Lastly, some people may say that their intuitions are at least more likely to be right than wrong, and that even if they are wrong they will do no harm, whereas if they are right but do not act on their intuitions, harm will occur. Unfortunately, this depends on a subjective definition of harm, which all too often rests upon the very intuitions in question. Re-using the homosexuality example, a supporter might claim that allowing homosexuality (against their intuitions) would cause great moral harm, but preventing people from acting on homosexual wishes does those people no harm, because they can always be heterosexual. Naturally, this is fallacious, because homosexuals are not heterosexual - but because of their intuitive 'knowledge' of the matter, people may not recognise this.
Sunday, March 11, 2012
Losing Sight of the Point
In the beginning of Friday's class, we briefly discussed how teaching is the only career in which people will thank one for not coming in to work. I think this is a good point, and it highlights a problem which I have noticed in the education system as a whole, particularly the American system.
The problem is that students tend to lose sight of the point of education - namely, to become educated. One type of student begins to focus on grades alone, seeing school as a kind of competition where they don't actually need to learn anything, but need only to get the best grades possible. This type of student will never object to something that a teacher says, even if they disagree with it - they don't care what is right, they only care that the teacher likes them enough to grade them well. The other type of student sees school as work forced upon them by others - a kind of slavery, so to speak. In middle and high school, this can sometimes be true, due to the current configuration of the American education system. However, once one reaches college, school becomes optional.
It is, of course, likely that everyone will experience a few days upon which they do not wish to go to class, either because they are feeling sick (but not sick enough to skip class) or they are upset or they have something else they wish to do. It is also possible that there may be a class which is required in order to take other, desired classes, and people may complain about such a class, but the common attitude seems to go far beyond this. People complain every time they have to go to class, in every one of their classes. In cases like this, one must wonder why these people are in college at all. I think that this attitude is likely a carry-over from high school, where the students' mentality is still stuck in their former mode of education.
The problem is that students tend to lose sight of the point of education - namely, to become educated. One type of student begins to focus on grades alone, seeing school as a kind of competition where they don't actually need to learn anything, but need only to get the best grades possible. This type of student will never object to something that a teacher says, even if they disagree with it - they don't care what is right, they only care that the teacher likes them enough to grade them well. The other type of student sees school as work forced upon them by others - a kind of slavery, so to speak. In middle and high school, this can sometimes be true, due to the current configuration of the American education system. However, once one reaches college, school becomes optional.
It is, of course, likely that everyone will experience a few days upon which they do not wish to go to class, either because they are feeling sick (but not sick enough to skip class) or they are upset or they have something else they wish to do. It is also possible that there may be a class which is required in order to take other, desired classes, and people may complain about such a class, but the common attitude seems to go far beyond this. People complain every time they have to go to class, in every one of their classes. In cases like this, one must wonder why these people are in college at all. I think that this attitude is likely a carry-over from high school, where the students' mentality is still stuck in their former mode of education.
Friday, March 9, 2012
Q&A 7, Second Answer
The basic form of my question is: Is the term 'feminism' too biased in favour of women to be an appropriate moniker for a movement advocating gender equality?
Yes, I think so. Originally, feminism was quite an appropriate label, as virtually all of the inequality was at the expense of women, but in modern times there is also quite a bit of inequality towards men, and there are also other genders which are becoming increasingly visible, which face more inequality than either of the 'binary' genders. A more descriptive name, such as 'egalitarianism' might be better. Of course, that term is sometimes applied, and there are also other obscure terms which a few people use, but in order to make a difference use of the term would have to become widespread.
Some people also make an attempt to be inclusive by using a variety of terms in combination. Such a person might call themselves a feminist, progressive masculist, LGBT-etc. ally, and so on. This, however, becomes rather clunky and is hardly aesthetically pleasing, so a single all-inclusive term would most likely be preferable.
Yes, I think so. Originally, feminism was quite an appropriate label, as virtually all of the inequality was at the expense of women, but in modern times there is also quite a bit of inequality towards men, and there are also other genders which are becoming increasingly visible, which face more inequality than either of the 'binary' genders. A more descriptive name, such as 'egalitarianism' might be better. Of course, that term is sometimes applied, and there are also other obscure terms which a few people use, but in order to make a difference use of the term would have to become widespread.
Some people also make an attempt to be inclusive by using a variety of terms in combination. Such a person might call themselves a feminist, progressive masculist, LGBT-etc. ally, and so on. This, however, becomes rather clunky and is hardly aesthetically pleasing, so a single all-inclusive term would most likely be preferable.
Q&A 7, First Answer
The basic form of my question is: Could associating animal rights with another, more visible social movement help it advance?
Perhaps, but only, I think, if the chosen social movement was very widely supported - for example, the movement advocating equal rights for black Americans. Otherwise, the movements would simply drag one another down by implying that in order to support one, a person must also support the other. Social movements such as that for LGBT (and all the other sometimes-included letters) rights, for example, would suffer enormously from the suggestion that in order to support them, one must also be a vegetarian/vegan. Similarly, animal rights would suffer from the suggestion that one must support all of the members of the LGBT-etc. community.
Perhaps, but only, I think, if the chosen social movement was very widely supported - for example, the movement advocating equal rights for black Americans. Otherwise, the movements would simply drag one another down by implying that in order to support one, a person must also support the other. Social movements such as that for LGBT (and all the other sometimes-included letters) rights, for example, would suffer enormously from the suggestion that in order to support them, one must also be a vegetarian/vegan. Similarly, animal rights would suffer from the suggestion that one must support all of the members of the LGBT-etc. community.
Thursday, March 8, 2012
Response: Wrong Direction
In response to Justine Cozza's post on 3/8/12:
Rather than suggesting that society should remove the stigma from women's consumption of meat (a stigma which has largely disappeared in American society, by the way - it is simply that women tend to be more accepted than men if they choose to be vegetarians/vegans), it would probably be better than men's consumption of meat gains a stigma associated with it, and men's choosing to be vegetarians/vegans loses its stigma. While the article we read didn't go too far into the moral implications of meat-eating, they are considerable and negative. I do not support the idea of associating feminism with environmental concerns and animal rights, but perhaps it would be better to at least start changing gender roles with regards to meat consumption - simply in the other direction than the above post seems to be suggesting.
Rather than suggesting that society should remove the stigma from women's consumption of meat (a stigma which has largely disappeared in American society, by the way - it is simply that women tend to be more accepted than men if they choose to be vegetarians/vegans), it would probably be better than men's consumption of meat gains a stigma associated with it, and men's choosing to be vegetarians/vegans loses its stigma. While the article we read didn't go too far into the moral implications of meat-eating, they are considerable and negative. I do not support the idea of associating feminism with environmental concerns and animal rights, but perhaps it would be better to at least start changing gender roles with regards to meat consumption - simply in the other direction than the above post seems to be suggesting.
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
Response: Unlikely Ideals
In response to Andrew Nelson's post "Can animals live a better life if they are destined for the slaughter?" (March 6, 2012):
I agree with most of this post, but I think it neglects two critical points. Firstly, no matter how pleasant a life and humane a death farmers might choose to give to cattle, the fact remains that they are cutting the cattle's lives short. That is in and of itself unethical. In order for the practice to be fully ethical, they would have to wait until the cattle dies natural deaths (as of old age) before preparing and consuming their meat - an unlikely objective, as it risks producing diseased meat, and because many people would not be willing to purchase or consume the tough, aged meat of cattle who died natural deaths. Secondly, regardless of whether the prior ideal could exist as an industry, it does not exist now. As such, consuming beef (and other types of meat, with the possible exception of venison due to the current horrific overpopulation of deer) is and will almost certainly remain unethical.
There is one way in which eating beef could continue as a practice without endorsing immorality - by creating cloned meat. Cloned meat does not require the death of cattle, and while it is currently prohibitively expensive (and banned in many places) in the future it could well become a viable alternative to vegetarianism, so long as people show sufficient interest in continuing to research it.
I agree with most of this post, but I think it neglects two critical points. Firstly, no matter how pleasant a life and humane a death farmers might choose to give to cattle, the fact remains that they are cutting the cattle's lives short. That is in and of itself unethical. In order for the practice to be fully ethical, they would have to wait until the cattle dies natural deaths (as of old age) before preparing and consuming their meat - an unlikely objective, as it risks producing diseased meat, and because many people would not be willing to purchase or consume the tough, aged meat of cattle who died natural deaths. Secondly, regardless of whether the prior ideal could exist as an industry, it does not exist now. As such, consuming beef (and other types of meat, with the possible exception of venison due to the current horrific overpopulation of deer) is and will almost certainly remain unethical.
There is one way in which eating beef could continue as a practice without endorsing immorality - by creating cloned meat. Cloned meat does not require the death of cattle, and while it is currently prohibitively expensive (and banned in many places) in the future it could well become a viable alternative to vegetarianism, so long as people show sufficient interest in continuing to research it.
Saturday, March 3, 2012
Q&A 6, Second Answer
My question is: Are
some theological views inherently more rational than others?
Yes, unless one subscribes to a theory of universal (or near-universal, like Descartes' theories) fallibility. If one does this, then nothing is more rational than anything else. If not, however, then theological views which incorporate paradoxes, without making some sort of provision to explain them, are less rational than others. Similarly, theological views which claim to rely on material evidence are also less rational. However, views that take into account the non-empirical nature of deities while still remaining religious are not less (or more) rational than a total lack of belief.
Yes, unless one subscribes to a theory of universal (or near-universal, like Descartes' theories) fallibility. If one does this, then nothing is more rational than anything else. If not, however, then theological views which incorporate paradoxes, without making some sort of provision to explain them, are less rational than others. Similarly, theological views which claim to rely on material evidence are also less rational. However, views that take into account the non-empirical nature of deities while still remaining religious are not less (or more) rational than a total lack of belief.
Q&A 6, First Answer
The basic form of my question is: Would it be possible to teach courses on theology without views from institutions, teachers, and authors of material leaking in?
I think it would be possible only to an extent. Due to the huge number of educational institutions in the world, it is probably inevitable that not all teachers would be proficient at (or even interested in) keeping their theological views out of their teaching (that is, not giving students the impression that one view is invalid), and some institutions would most likely go their own way and incorporate biased views into their teachings. However, in most cases, it might be possible to have a universal (by state, nation, continent, or even world) curriculum set up, which limited course materials to unbiased sources. It also might be possible to set in place stringent requirements for teaching, so that the teacher-generated bias could be minimal. Also, institutions going against these rules would probably be less common if institutions had to follow the rules in order to receive non-private funding.
I think it would be possible only to an extent. Due to the huge number of educational institutions in the world, it is probably inevitable that not all teachers would be proficient at (or even interested in) keeping their theological views out of their teaching (that is, not giving students the impression that one view is invalid), and some institutions would most likely go their own way and incorporate biased views into their teachings. However, in most cases, it might be possible to have a universal (by state, nation, continent, or even world) curriculum set up, which limited course materials to unbiased sources. It also might be possible to set in place stringent requirements for teaching, so that the teacher-generated bias could be minimal. Also, institutions going against these rules would probably be less common if institutions had to follow the rules in order to receive non-private funding.
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
Compensation
Several times over the past week, the subject of why people would choose to follow a religion has come up in class. While I think there are far too many answers to that question for me to address here, I thought I would bring up one particularly strong reason which may, in many cases, lead to the conclusion that religion is not only a valid option, but a better option.
This reason is that, in many traditions, religion provides the believer with a source of unconditional love. In many denominations of Christianity, this source is Jesus. According to the literature of these denominations, Jesus gave his life for all of humanity, sinners included. In a world where unconditional love is often spoken of but rarely actually present, such a figure might well appeal to many, particularly those who feel especially alone. I think that in such cases, religion might be a better option than atheism, because having a belief that a person (or rather, a deity) exists, who loves one despite all of the flaws one may possess, can be a powerful motivation to continue living in circumstances which might otherwise cause one to give up.
Clearly, such a belief tends to be inferior to unconditional love from another tangible human being, but it can be a form of compensation which will hopefully in time become unnecessary. This is not to say that people who are happy should not be religious; as I have stated in my earlier posts, as long as a person's faith causes no harm to anyone, and is not irrational (some may dispute that faith is always irrational, but I disagree; I brought up this issue in my earlier posts) then it is no less valid or good an option than atheism or agnosticism.
This reason is that, in many traditions, religion provides the believer with a source of unconditional love. In many denominations of Christianity, this source is Jesus. According to the literature of these denominations, Jesus gave his life for all of humanity, sinners included. In a world where unconditional love is often spoken of but rarely actually present, such a figure might well appeal to many, particularly those who feel especially alone. I think that in such cases, religion might be a better option than atheism, because having a belief that a person (or rather, a deity) exists, who loves one despite all of the flaws one may possess, can be a powerful motivation to continue living in circumstances which might otherwise cause one to give up.
Clearly, such a belief tends to be inferior to unconditional love from another tangible human being, but it can be a form of compensation which will hopefully in time become unnecessary. This is not to say that people who are happy should not be religious; as I have stated in my earlier posts, as long as a person's faith causes no harm to anyone, and is not irrational (some may dispute that faith is always irrational, but I disagree; I brought up this issue in my earlier posts) then it is no less valid or good an option than atheism or agnosticism.
Response: Fallibility of EVERYTHING
In response to Rachel Niddrie's post "Seeing is Believing?" (February 28, 2012):
I would agree that, for some people, religion is nothing more than a way to dispel fears about death and other difficult topics. However, making the jump from believing that this is true of some people to believing it is true of everyone does not, to me, seems reasonable. There are many reasons that people may choose to believe in a deity, from the aforementioned fear, to convention, to genuine, unselfishly motivated belief. It is easy to look at only Christianity and, from that religion's punishment-and-reward afterlife system, think that everyone following it - and, indeed, following any religion - is doing so only out of fear. However, there are many different divisions of Christianity, and many religions which are not Christianity. Some divisions of Christianity do not endorse the concept of hell. Some religions, such as Hinduism, have nonexistence (rather than eternal life) as their ultimate goal.
Lastly, to a point, any worldview incorporates some sort of faith. Even believing only what you detect with your senses requires faith that your senses are not deceiving you; which, even independent of the notion of fallibility, can happen (hallucinations, mirages, etc.) If you do consider the idea of fallibility, you may find (like Descartes) that essentially everything is fallible. As such, in order to make any sort of conclusions about the world around you, you must have faith in something - even if that something is as seemingly basic as the existence of the world.
I would agree that, for some people, religion is nothing more than a way to dispel fears about death and other difficult topics. However, making the jump from believing that this is true of some people to believing it is true of everyone does not, to me, seems reasonable. There are many reasons that people may choose to believe in a deity, from the aforementioned fear, to convention, to genuine, unselfishly motivated belief. It is easy to look at only Christianity and, from that religion's punishment-and-reward afterlife system, think that everyone following it - and, indeed, following any religion - is doing so only out of fear. However, there are many different divisions of Christianity, and many religions which are not Christianity. Some divisions of Christianity do not endorse the concept of hell. Some religions, such as Hinduism, have nonexistence (rather than eternal life) as their ultimate goal.
Lastly, to a point, any worldview incorporates some sort of faith. Even believing only what you detect with your senses requires faith that your senses are not deceiving you; which, even independent of the notion of fallibility, can happen (hallucinations, mirages, etc.) If you do consider the idea of fallibility, you may find (like Descartes) that essentially everything is fallible. As such, in order to make any sort of conclusions about the world around you, you must have faith in something - even if that something is as seemingly basic as the existence of the world.
Monday, February 27, 2012
Not a Bad Thing
In the essay we read this week, the author appeared to imply that all religious belief was irrational and bad. Apparently, an ideal world would not include religion. While I am not religious myself (I am an agnostic), I do not agree with this view at all.
While it is true that some religious beliefs stretch the boundaries of credibility, many do not. Some deities have by their very definitions the quality of being unknowable. Thus, the lack of evidence for their existence is in itself not evidence at all for their nonexistence. As these deities are inherently beyond human comprehension, belief in them is not irrational, any more than belief in the infinite nature of numbers is irrational simply because humans cannot accurately imagine infinity in any manner which is not merely representational. Belief in these sorts of deities is not more rational than atheism, but neither is it less rational.
Nor are religious beliefs necessarily bad. While on many occasions religion has been used as justification for annoying, bad, or even atrocious actions, not all religions endorse this sort of behaviour, and even those which have directly inspired the behaviour may not be bad in themselves - the person who performs the bad acts may have warped the beliefs to fit their own ends.
In fact, religion can on occasion be a good, rather than merely neutral, thing. In the cases of people who are stuck in a bad situation, belief can be comforting. If a person is lonely and has no close friends, they may find it reassuring to imagine the existence of a supernatural being who loves them unconditionally. There is of course a negative flipside to this feature of religion - faith can sometimes lessen people's will to act - but as long as a religion contains no encouragement to sit back and let events continue as they will, there is not a problem with using it to help in difficult situations.
While it is true that some religious beliefs stretch the boundaries of credibility, many do not. Some deities have by their very definitions the quality of being unknowable. Thus, the lack of evidence for their existence is in itself not evidence at all for their nonexistence. As these deities are inherently beyond human comprehension, belief in them is not irrational, any more than belief in the infinite nature of numbers is irrational simply because humans cannot accurately imagine infinity in any manner which is not merely representational. Belief in these sorts of deities is not more rational than atheism, but neither is it less rational.
Nor are religious beliefs necessarily bad. While on many occasions religion has been used as justification for annoying, bad, or even atrocious actions, not all religions endorse this sort of behaviour, and even those which have directly inspired the behaviour may not be bad in themselves - the person who performs the bad acts may have warped the beliefs to fit their own ends.
In fact, religion can on occasion be a good, rather than merely neutral, thing. In the cases of people who are stuck in a bad situation, belief can be comforting. If a person is lonely and has no close friends, they may find it reassuring to imagine the existence of a supernatural being who loves them unconditionally. There is of course a negative flipside to this feature of religion - faith can sometimes lessen people's will to act - but as long as a religion contains no encouragement to sit back and let events continue as they will, there is not a problem with using it to help in difficult situations.
Friday, February 24, 2012
Q&A 5, Second Answer
The basic form of my question is: If
free will or chance does exist, what happens to the decisions that we did not
make or the random events which did not occur?
I think that the most likely solution (which is not likely; I don't think that free will exists, and chance seems unlikely as well) is that these untaken options would lead to the creation of alternate timelines. As there would be an infinite number of options - deciding to move one's hand is not a yes-or-no choice; one can decide to move it different distances, and as distance is infinitely divisible there are an infinite number of possible choices - there would have to be an infinite number of timelines as well.
I think that the most likely solution (which is not likely; I don't think that free will exists, and chance seems unlikely as well) is that these untaken options would lead to the creation of alternate timelines. As there would be an infinite number of options - deciding to move one's hand is not a yes-or-no choice; one can decide to move it different distances, and as distance is infinitely divisible there are an infinite number of possible choices - there would have to be an infinite number of timelines as well.
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